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In this paper we conduct a quantitative analysis to investigate the pattern of output loss during past banking crisis
episodes by comparing the Great Recession, Great Depression and "Inter-Greats" periods. We find that during all
periods output does not fully recover after 5 years from the onset of the banking crisis. However, while the output loss
during the Great Recession was as large as that during the Great Depression, the output decline was much more
gradual during the Great Recession. Moreover, a neoclassical growth model with productivity shocks can account for
the Great Recession period extremely well compared to the Great Depression and Inter-Greats periods.
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1 Introduction
The recent Great Recession had an undoubtedly large and widespread e¤ect
on the world economy characterized by a global banking crisis. In this paper
we compare the recession patterns after banking crises during the Great
Recession and compare them to past episodes. In particular, we conduct a
supply side decomposition of the output decline and a simulation based on
a neoclassical growth model.
Several studies have investigated the magnitude of output loss after bank-
ing crises. Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2006), Barro (2001), Laeven and Valencia
(2013), and Kannan et al. (2009) measure output loss as the forgone output
growth after the crises. According to these studies, full recovery is dened
as when the output growth rate has returned to the pre-crisis trend growth
rate. These studies nd that the growth impairment of a banking crisis is up
to 10 percentage points and the time to recovery lies between 2 to 5 years.
Cerra and Saxena (2008) and Abiad et al. (2009) measure output loss as
the deviation of detrended output level from its per-crisis trend level. Based
on this measure, an economy has fully recovered if and only if detrended
output returns to its pre-crisis trend level. This denition of recovery requires
not only for the growth rate to recover, but even to outperform its pre-crisis
performance. These studies nd that banking crises have large and persistent
e¤ects on output loss and economies seldom regain their output level over
a short to medium term horizon. Abiad et al (2009) further decomposes
the output loss into its supply-side components and nd that employment,
capital, and total factor productivity all contributed to the persistent fall in
output after banking crises during the 1970-2002 period. In this paper we
follow their detrending and decomposition method.
Our main contributions with respect to Abiad et al (2009) are that we, i)
extend the sample period to investigate the Great Recession and the Great
Depression periods; ii) include hours worked per worker as a production
factor to provide a better measure of total factor productivity; iii) simulate
a neoclassical growth model following Cole and Ohanian (1999) for various
countries during the Great Recession, Great Depression and Inter-Greats
periods. We nd that total factor productivity played an important role in
accounting for recessions following banking crises.
2 Data and Method
In this paper, we compare the banking crisis episodes in the Great Recession
period to those in the interwar Great Depression and those in between the
two which we call "Inter-Greats". For the Great Recession period we in-
clude 21 of the episodes listed in Laeven and Valencia (2013) based on data
availability. For the Great Depression period we include 8 of the episodes
listed in Bernanke and James (1989) based on data availability. Finally, for
the Inter-Greats period we include the 18 episodes studied by Reinhart and
Rogo¤ (2008). The full set of countries and crisis years are listed in Table 1.
Table 1. Banking Crisis Episodes
Great Depression Inter-Greats Great Recession
Country Year Country Year Country Year
Austria 1931 UK 1974 UK 2007
Belgium 1931 Germany 1977 US 2007
France 1931 Spain 1977 Austria 2008
Germany 1931 Canada 1983 Belgium 2008
Italy 1931 US 1984 Denmark 2008
US 1931 Iceland 1985 France 2008
UK 1931 Denmark 1987 Germany 2008
Sweden 1932 Norway 1987 Greece 2008
New Zealand 1987 Hungary 2008
Australia 1989 Iceland 2008
Italy 1990 Ireland 2008
Finland 1991 Italy 2008
UK 1991 Latvia 2008
Greece 1991 Luxembourg 2008
Sweden 1991 Netherlands 2008
Japan 1992 Portugal 2008
France 1994 Russia 2008




For the supply side decomposition, we assume a detrended per capita
Cobb-Douglas production function
byt =cAt bkt (etht)1  (1)
where by and bk are detrended per capita output and capital stock, e is per
capita employment, h is hours worked per worker, and bA is total factor
productivity respectively. The capital income share  is set equal to 1/3
throughout this paper.1 Following Abiad et al (2013) we detrend output
and capital with the average per capita annual output growth rate between
t =  10 to t =  3 where t = 0 corresponds to the year of the banking crisis.2
In order to assess the magnitude of the crises, we measure the level of
each variable as their log deviation from their level at the year prior to the
crisis t =  1. The decomposition of output deviation is:
ebyt =fcAt + ebkt + (1  )et + (1  )eht;
where
ext = ln xt   ln x 1:
Data of all variables for the Great Depression period is from Klein and
Otsu (2013). For the Inter-Greats and Great Recession periods, data of
output, capital stock, and employment are from Penn World Tables while
data for hours worked is from OECD statistics.3 Since the Penn World
Tables data ends in 2011, we extrapolate the data set up to 2013 for the
Great Recession period using data from OECD Statistics.
1Gollin (2002) shows that after appropriate adjustment, income share of capital is
roughly 1/3 in most countries in the sample.
2We prefer this linear detrending method as it does not remove medium term uctu-
ations like Exponential, Band-Pass and Hodrick-Prescott lters do and it allows country
specic variations in the trend growth rates. We conduct a sensitivity analysis using a
common 2% linear growth trend for all samples and nd that the main results of the paper
hold.
3Exceptions are hours in Iceland, Latvia, and Spain in which case we used Conference
Board TED data accessed through macrobond.
3 The Great Recession and Supply-Side De-
composition
3.1 The Great Recession
We rst focus on the Great Recession period and investigate the recovery
after the banking crises. Figure 1 plots the mean output deviation from trend
and its 95% condence interval for countries that went through banking crises
during the Great Recession. Period 0 refers to the data the banking crisis
has taken place. The condence intervals are computed from bootstrapping
with 10000 draws. This gure clearly shows that detrended output declined
after the outbreak of the banking crisis. The drop of output was largest in
the year after the banking crisis and the decline continues to date without
any signs of recovery.



























Figure 1: Output during the Great Recession
Figure 2 plots the mean and bootstrapped condence intervals of de-
trended per capita capital stock, per capita employment, hours worked per
worker and total factor productivity. Capital stock gradually declined after
the banking crisis occurred and fell 7% below the pre-crisis level over 5 years.
Employment temporarily increased on the onset of the banking crisis and
then gradually declined by 5% relative to the pre-crisis level over 5 years.
Hours worked declined mildly compared to capital and employment with a
2.5% drop relative to the pre-crisis level over ve years. The variation of the
decline in hours across countries is much smaller compared to capital and
employment leading to a narrow condence interval. Finally, total factor
productivity sharply drops immediately after the banking crisis and shows
no sign of recovery.




































































































Figure 2: Decomposition of the Great Recession
3.2 The Past vs the Present
Next, we compare the Great Recession to past banking crisis episodes. Fig-
ure 3 compares the output decline during the Great Recession period to
those during the Great Depression period and Inter-Greats period. The up-
per panel plots the mean and bootstrapped condence interval of the output
during the Great Depression period and the mean output of the Great Re-
cession period. This shows that the initial output drop during the Great
Recession period was smaller compared to that during the Great Depression
at a 95% condence level. However, since two years after the banking crisis,
the mean output decline of the Great Recession period enters the condence
interval. The lower panel shows that the initial output drop during the Great
Recession period was at a similar level as that of the Inter-Greats period.
However, since one year after the banking crisis, the mean output decline
of the Great Recession period signicantly exceeds that of the Inter-Greats
period at the 95% condence level.
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Figure 3: Output Compared to Past Crises
Figure 4 compares the production factors during the Great Recession pe-
riod to those during the Great Depression period. Capital stock does not fall
as much in the Great Recession period than in the Great Depression period.
Employment during the Great Recession period signicantly exceeds that
during the Great Depression period for the rst 2 years after the banking
crisis and gradually converges to the Great Depression level. Hours worked
during the Great Depression have a temporary decline followed with a recov-
ery while that during the Great Recession declines gradually. Total factor
productivity drops slightly more rapidly in the Great Depression period than
in the Great Recession period but overall the magnitude of decline is very
similar.






































































































Figure 4: Decomposition Compared to the Great Depression
Figure 5 compares the production factors during the Great Recession
period to those during the Inter-Greats period. Capital stock, employment
and hours during the Great Recession decline slightly more than that those
during the Inter-Greats period. Nonetheless, the Great Recession period
means lie within the condence intervals of the Inter-Greats period for all
variables. Total factor productivity, however, declines much more during the
Great Recession period than that during the Inter-Greats period.






































































































Figure 5: Decomposition Compared to the Inter-Greats
In sum, we nd that the decline of detrended output during the Great
Recession is much larger than that during the Inter-Greats period mainly
due to the large decline in total factor productivity. Furthermore, the out-
put decline during the Great Recession is as large as that during the Great
Depression whereas it occurs more gradually due to the slower adjustment
of capital and employment.
4 The Great Recession through the Lens of
a Neoclassical Growth Model
In this section, we simulate a neoclassical growth model to replicate the
crises periods following the Cole and Ohanian (1999) exercise for the US






t [	 log bct + (1 	) log (1  lt)]
sub:to cAt bktl1 t = bct +dkt+1   (1  )bkt
where bc and l are detrended consumption and total hours worked l = eh,
respectively.4 We assume the following stochastic process for productivity
shocks fcAt = gdAt 1 + ";
where " is an i.i.d. shock. We set the parameters values at levels consistent
with the literature as listed in Table 2.5
Table 2. Parameter Values
   	 
1/3 0.96 0.06 0.30 0.90
Figure 6 shows the simulation results of output uctuation from the model
taking the total factor productivity series for each period as given. For the
Great Depression period, the model signicantly understates the drop of
output during the initial periods. For the Inter-Greats period, the model
signicantly understates the output drop during the later period. Finally,
for the Great Recession period, the model does extremely well in accounting
for the initial drop in output while it slightly understates the decline in output
during the later periods.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we compare the banking crisis episodes during the Great Re-
cession to those during the Great Depression and "Inter-Greats" periods by
decomposing the supply-side e¤ects. We nd that output has not recovered
to their pre-crisis trend levels after 5 years from the onset of banking crises
4Notice that we cannot distinguish between hours and employment in a standard neo-
classical growth model. Total hours worked is normalized so that the sum of labor and
leisure equals to one.
5We conduct a sensitivity analysis on the parameter  since this not only a¤ects the
model but also directly a¤ects the measurement of total factor productivity. We nd that
the results with  = 0:4 are similar to those presented in this paper.










































































Figure 6: Simulation Results
during all periods. In terms of the magnitude, the output decline during the
Great Depression and Great Recession were more than twice as large as that
during the Inter-Greats period due to the dramatic decline in total factor
productivity. Furthermore, while the magnitudes of the two are compara-
ble, output decline in the Great Recession period was more gradual than
that in the Great Depression period due to the slower adjustments in capi-
tal and employment. Finally, a neoclassical growth model with productivity
shocks can account for the output decline during the Great Recession well
compared to those during the Great Depression and "Inter-Greats" periods.
Our results encourage future studies on the Great Recession to focus on why
productivity fell so dramatically after the onset of the banking crises.
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